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Recent Developments
Federal Employment of Homosexuals:
Narrowing the Efficiency Standard
Congress has authorized the President to:
(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals
into the civil service in the executive branch as will best pro-
mote the efficiency of that service;
(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, character,
knowledge, and ability for the employment sought .... 1
Furthermore, Congress has provided that no civil servant may be discharged
unless his removal is for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service." 2
The task of implementing the directives of Congress and the President has
been delegated to the United States Civil Service Commission.3 In line
with its mission under this delegation, the Commission has provided for the
disqualification of applicants 4 and the removal of employees 5 because of
"[c]riminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful con-
duct."6
Although homosexual conduct is not specifically mentioned in the regula-
tions, there is little doubt as to the Commission's position on this subject. In a
recent policy statement, the Commission stated: "Persons about whom there
is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited others to engage in homo-
sexual or sexually perverted acts with them, without evidence of rehabilita-
tion, are not suitable for Federal employment."' The Commission justifies its
exclusionary policy by noting that homosexual conduct is a crime in every
jurisdiction of the United States except Illinois, and that it is contrary to
the prevailing mores of our society.8 Furthermore, the Commission states
that such conduct may lead to service inefficiency for any one of the follow-
1. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV, 1969).
2. Id. H8 7501(a), 7512(a).
3. Exec. Order No. 10,577, 3 C.F.R. 218, 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
4. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1968).
5. Id. § 752.104.
6. Id. § 731.201(b).
7. Letter from John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, United States Civil Service Commis-
sion, to The Mattachine Society of Washington, Feb. 25, 1966. The Mattachine
Society is composed of avowed homosexuals and others who advocate the repeal of
sodomy laws and restrictive employment practices which discriminate against homosex-
uals.
8. Id.
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ing reasons: (1) the revulsion of fellow employees and their apprehension
of homosexual advances; (2) the erotic stimulation of the homosexual
through use of common toilet, etc.; (3) the hazard that homosexual activity
will be fostered, particularly among the youthful employees; and (4) the
offense to members of the public who must transact business with the Gov-
ernment.9 The Commission's position appears to reflect the sentiments of
Congress for, as the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments has stated, "homosexuals and
other sex perverts are not proper persons to be employed in Government
for two reasons; first, they are generally unsuitable, and second, they con-
stitute security risks."'10
Judicial review of the Commission's policy has been infrequent. The no-
tion that government employment is a privilege, not a right, and the popular
tradition of judicial noninterference with the executive branch have been the
bases on which most courts support their refusal to interfere." Because of
the concentration of federal employees in the District of Columbia and the
fact that, until 1962, only the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia-through exercise of its power to issue original writs of man-
damus-had the power to give the proper relief,' 2 i.e., reinstatement, to an
illegally removed federal employee, most of the judicial opinions concern-
ing the Commission's removal policy derive from the federal courts in the
District of Columbia. Since the basis of the Commission's removal policy
is the congressional mandate that no one shall be discharged except to pro-
mote service efficiency, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit-through its unique position-can exert profound
influence upon the employment practices of the Commission through its in-
terpretation of that mandate. Recently, in Norton v. Macy s the D.C. Circuit
exerted such an influence upon the Commission's policy regarding the suitabil-
ity of homosexuals for federal employment.
9. Id.
10. EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT,
S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950). The Subcommittee stated that homo-
sexuals were unsuitable for the following reasons: (1) homosexual acts are criminal;(2) such acts are contrary to accepted norms; (3) such acts evidence emotional in-
stability; (4) indulgence in such acts weakens the moral fiber of the individual; (5)
homosexuals have a corrosive influence on fellow employees; and (6) homosexuals in
positions of responsibility tend to place other homosexuals in government jobs. The
Subcommittee's sentiments were crystallized when it concluded that one homosexual can
pollute a whole government office. Id. at 3, 4.
11. See generally Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available to Federal Employees
Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 287 (1968).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964); ci. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 516 (1952).
13. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Norton v. Macy
At about 2:00 a.m. on October 22, 1963, Clifford L. Norton, a GS-14 budget
analyst for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
drove to Lafayette Square in Washington, D.C. He stopped his car and in-
vited one Procter, who was standing on the curb, to get in. Then Norton
circled the block, stopped his car and dropped off his passenger. Procter
walked to his own car, got in, and followed Norton to Norton's apartment.
Upon reaching the parking lot at Norton's residence, the two men were ap-
proached by two Morals Squad officers of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department who had observed the above sequence of events and had
followed the pair-at speeds exceeding the legal limit-to the parking lot.
During questioning by the police, Procter told them that while driving around
Lafayette Square, Norton had caressed his leg and invited him up to his
apartment. The police arrested the men for speeding and brought them to
the Morals Office in order to issue traffic citations.
Once at the station, the police questioned the pair for about two hours con-
cerning the events of the evening and their prior sexual histories. Norton
continously denied that he had made a homosexual advance to Procter.
Because Norton was a NASA employee, a NASA security officer was called
to the station and permitted to monitor the interrogation. At the conclusion
of the questioning, Norton and Procter were issued traffic citations and re-
leased.
At this time the NASA security officer identified himself and asked Norton
to follow him to the security office at NASA for further discussion. During
the course of this discussion-which lasted until 6:30 a.m.-Norton related
his sexual history to the security officer and his assistant. He revealed that
he had engaged in mutual masturbation in high school and college. He also
related that he sometimes experienced homosexual desires while drinking,
and that on two recent occasions, after drinking, he had blacked out tempo-
rarily. Norton suspected that he might have engaged in homosexual activity
during these blackouts. When asked what had transpired while he was
driving Procter around Lafayette Square, Norton said he had experienced a
blackout, recovered, and asked Procter up to his apartment for a drink.
About three weeks later, Procter confirmed the story he had given the
police in a letter written to NASA. He concluded that "from [Norton's]
actions and conversation it would take an idiot not to be able to figure that he
wanted to have sex act on me."'1 4 Norton, in written reply to a notice of
14. Brief for Appellant at JA 111-12, id.
1969]
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proposed dismissal by NASA, again denied making a homosexual overture to
Procter. While admitting incidents of mutual masturbation which he attrib-
uted to normal adolescent sexual curiosity, he strongly denied that he was a
homosexual, had homosexual tendencies, or had committed homosexual
acts.15 He claimed that any statements that he may have made to the con-
trary during his discussion with NASA security officials were due to "[a]
combination of official badgering, wheedling and cajolery . . . directed
against a tired, sick and frightened victim ... ."16
After considering Norton's letter, NASA discharged him on the grounds
that his immoral conduct and his personality traits rendered him unsuitable
for government employment. The Civil Service Commission Board of Ap-
peals and Review sustained his removal as being "for such cause as will pro-
mote the efficiency of the service.' 7 Norton brought an action for reinstate-
ment in the district court and, after summary judgment was granted to the
Government, he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit.
The primary questions presented for review by the appellant were whether
he was afforded procedural fairness, and whether the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the agency's charges.' 8 The appellant also questioned the infer-
ence that his removal would promote the efficiency of the service.' 9 The
court ignored the appellant's primary questions and concerned itself with the
issue of whether the appellant's presumed homosexual advance and person-
ality traits constituted such cause for removal as would promote the efficiency
of the service.20 So construed, the case would seem to be governed by Dew
v. Halaby2" and the Fifth Circuit's recent opinion in Anonymous v. Macy."2
In the Dew case, the District of Columbia Circuit refused to overturn a
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) determination that an air traffic controller's
15. Id. at JA 102.
16. Id. at JA 101.
17. Id. at JA 121.
18. Id. at 10. The appellant argued that he was arrested without sufficient prob-
able cause and illegally interrogated; that the tainted fruit of such arrest and interrogation
should not have been admitted as evidence at the Commission's hearing; and that he
was deprived of the opportunity to answer or rebut Procter and the arresting officers
since they did not appear as witnesses at the hearing. Id. at 11, 12, 18.
19. Id. at 14-16.
20. 417 F.2d at 1162. In order to shape the case in this manner, Chief Judge
Bazelon asserted that the court was convinced that Norton had made the alleged
homosexual advance, since Norton did not strenuously deny the sufficiency of the
evidence against him. Further, the Chief Judge ignored the main thrust of Norton's
brief, see note 18 supra, and some two-thirds of the Government's reply. See Brief for
Appellee at 11-26, Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
21. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 904, cert. dismissed,
379 U.S. 951 (1964).
22. 398 F.2d 317 (1968).
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pre-employment homosexual acts constituted sufficient cause for removal.
Dew had committed several isolated homosexual acts while in college-six
years prior to his appointment. He had been on the job for twenty months
and had received a satisfactory performance rating. Moreover, the record
contained an uncontradicted psychiatric report finding that Dew was a well-
adjusted family man, temperamentally suited for his current position.2 3  De-
spite these facts, the court, concerned with the demanding nature of the
position, deferred to the Agency's judgment and declared:
The judiciary has a very limited scope of review where removal of
a civil servant is challenged on its merits, rather than on pro-
cedural grounds. We certainly are in no position to say that re-
tention of the appellant, demonstrated to have evidenced a lack of
good character in the past, would promote, or would not have a
derogatory effect on, the efficiency of the service. The choice of
personnel to direct the Nation's air traffic is for the Federal Aviation
Agency, and not the courts.
24
Anonymous v. Macy concerned a postal employee'who was discharged for
committing homosexual acts. 25  In a per curiam opinion the Fifth Circuit
declared:
Counsel for appellant . . . argue at great length, and with con-
siderable ability, that homosexual acts constitute private acts upon
the part of such employees, that they do not affect the efficiency
of the service, and should not be the basis of discharge. That
contention is not accepted by this Court.
26
After shaping the Norton case to fit these precedents, Judge Bazelon pro-
ceeded to distinguish them. He discounted Anonymous v. Macy as the result
of the Fifth Circuit's belief that it had no right to review the merits of the
Commission's determination of unfitness. 2 7 He distinguished Dew v. Halaby
on the grounds that it was a narrow holding involving a new employee in a
job with special responsibilities. Moreover, he noted that the Supreme Court
23. 317 F.2d at 583 n.3. The psychiatrist indicated that Dew did not have a homo-
sexual personality disorder. In his opinion, the early isolated incidents of homosexual
conduct were the result of normal sexual investigation. Id.
24. Id. at 589.
25. 398 F.2d at 318. The defendant did not deny the alleged homosexual activity.
26. Id. The court was concerned solely with defendant's objection to the in-
troduction of an affidavit at his hearing. The court held that the defendant had waived
any objection to its introduction.
27. 417 F.2d at 1163, 1164. In Anonymous v. Macy, the Fifth Circuit had cited a
District of Columbia Circuit opinion, Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29, cert. denied,
353 U.S. 970 (1957), as its primary authority for this position. 398 F.2d at 318. In
Norton, Chief Judge Bazelon admitted that Hargett appears to bar review of the merits
of a removal but neither overruled nor distinguished the case. 417 F.2d at 1163, 1164
n.5.
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granted certiorari in Dew, and subsequently dismissed the writ when the
FAA reinstated the employee and granted him his back pay.28
Precedents aside, the Chief Judge then turned to the question which he
had formulated, i.e., whether off-duty homosexual conduct is sufficient cause
for dismissal on the grounds that termination will foster service efficiency.
He noted that the Commission has been afforded much discretion in its de-
termination of the reasons which will justify removal of a federal employee,
but added that the Commission's discretion is not unlimited. The require-
ments of due process forbid arbitrary and capricious removals, and seemingly
the need for due process is even greater where dismissal imposes a "badge of
infamy" or "the stigma of an official defamation of character" upon the dis-
missed employee.2 9  The Commission's discretion may be further limited
where removal involves a possible intrusion upon "that ill-defined area of
privacy which is increasingly if indistinctly recognized as a foundation of sev-
eral specific constitutional protections."'30
In addition to due process limitations, the statutory mandate limits the
Commission by requiring that a removal promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice.31 In the instant case, Norton's supervisor testified at the Commission's
hearing that Norton was "competent" and his work "very good."'32 He ruled
out any "real security problems," 33 and stated that fellow employees were not
informed of the incident.A4 Since the record before the court did not sub-
stantiate any conclusion that Norton's conduct had any injurious effect on the
efficiency of the service, the court found the removal unwarranted and re-
versed the decision of the district court.35
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tamm asserted that the majority was
meddling in the area of administrative discretion and declared that appel-
lant's removal would clearly serve the interests of service efficiency, since
retention in his present position might subject him to private extortion and his
employer to public reproach.3 6
28. 417 F.2d at 1166.
29. Id. at 1164. See also Local 473, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
898 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952).
30. 417 F.2d at 1164. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
32. Brief for Appellant at JA 28, Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at JA 23.
34. Id. at JA 26.
35. 417 F.2d at 1168. The appellee claimed that possible embarrassment to
NASA might interfere with the agency's performance, The court rejected this argu-
ment as being a possible smokescreen shielding personal antipathies and moral judg-
ments on the part of NASA officials. Id. at 1167.
36. Id. at 1168, 1169.
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The Significance of Norton
The number of homosexuals in the United States varies according to defi-
nition and source of the data. The Kinsey report, 7 the most widely accepted
study of American sexual practices, estimates that at least 37 percent of
American males have had at least one homosexual experience during their
lifetime, 38 and that 25 percent of American males have had continued homo-
sexual experiences over a three-year period sometime between the ages of 16
and 55.89 Various homosexual societies have estimated that their numbers
swell above 15 million in the United States. 40  The statistical variances are
probably due to differing characterizations of the term "homosexual" and the
behavior which it encompasses.
According to a recently released National Institute of Mental Health re-
port, 41 the range of sexual behavior stretched from the exclusively heterosexual
to the exclusively homosexual. 42 However, between these extremes exists the
predominantly heterosexual individual who may engage in sporadic homo-
sexual conduct and the homosexual who seeks occasional heterosexual ex-
periences. 43 The report notes that homosexuals are quite heterogeneous,
varying widely in their emotional adjustment and behavior patterns. 44
However defined and counted, homosexuals are directly affected by the
Norton decision because of its effect upon the restrictive employment prac-
37. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEIiAvioR IN THE HUMAN MALE
(1948).
38. Id. at 623.
39. Id. at 650-51.
40. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1968, at 29, col. 1; id. April 17, 1966, at 12, col. 1.
41. FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY (1969). In Septem-
ber 1967, a 15-member Task Force on Homosexuality was appointed by the Director
of the National Institute of Mental Health. The group was composed of behavioral,
medical, social, and legal scientists and was asked to review the current state of knowl-
edge regarding homosexuality and to make recommendations for Institute programming
in this area. One of the Task Force members was Chief Judge Bazelon, who resigned
from the group on June 3, 1969, less than one month before he handed down the Norton
decision. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3, 4. The report notes that present employment policies deal with the
homosexual as if all homosexual behavior were a specific category of behavior, despite
the variation in such individuals. Id. at 20. Considering the collective research and
clinical experience in this area, the report states that most professionals working in the
subject "are strongly convinced that the extreme opprobrium that our society has at-
tached to homosexual behavior, by way of criminal statutes and restrictive employment
practices, has done more social harm than good and goes beyond what is necessary for
the maintenance of public order and human decency." Id. at 17. The Task Force
recommends the removal of legal penalties for private homosexual conduct among con-
senting adults, and maintains that such a change in the law would "encourage revisions
in certain governmental regulations which now make homosexual acts a bar to employ-
ment or a cause for dismissal." Id. at 19. Three members of the Task Force expressed
reservations with respect to these suggestions on the grounds that the present scientific
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
tices of the federal government. Millions of homosexuals who, individually
or in groups, have been urging the abolishment of the blanket exclusion
policies of federal, 45 state,46 municipal, 47 and private employers, 48 will no
longer be barred from federal employment simply because their conduct does
not conform to the conventional norm.
The Norton case is significant because it is the first time that a circuit
court has squarely faced a direct challenge to the Commission's policy of
excluding homosexuals from federal employment.4 9  With Norton, the Dis-
data is insufficient to support such policy decisions. Id. at 2. Although the report notes
Chief Judge Bazelon's resignation, it does not indicate whether he took part in or gave
his support to these legal recommendations.
45. See note 49 infra. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1968, at 29, col. 1; id. May 30,
1965, at 42, col. 6. See generally R. MASTERS, THE HOMOSEXUAL REVOLUTION 130-71
(1962), wherein the author sets out the Homosexual Bill of Rights which includes:
(1) freedom to serve in the Armed Forces; (2) freedom to secure government employ-
ment; (3) freedom to "marry," adopt children, own property jointly, and take ad-
vantage of tax breaks; (4) freedom to wear whatever clothing desired; (5) freedom of
the press; and (6) freedom to perform homosexual acts between consenting adults.
46. Many state codes provide that applicants may be excluded because of their im-
moral, infamous, or notoriously disgraceful conduct. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127,
§ 63b108b.4 (1967); MINN. STAT. § 43.14 (1967); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 50 (4)(d)
(McKinney 1959); Wis. STAT. § 16.13 (1967). Others provide that permanent em-
ployees may be disciplined or removed for such conduct. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 19572 (West 1963); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 143.27 (Page 1969).
47. See, e.g., Brass v. Hoberman, 295 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the
court was asked to review the New York City Civil Service Commission's policy of
excluding homosexuals as a class from a few selected positions, such as caseworkers.
The city did not contest the plaintiff's proposition that blanket exclusion of homo-
sexuals from all city employment would be arbitrary, capricious, and hence unconsti-
tutional. Plaintiff went further, however, and argued that even a policy of exclusion
from selected positions was unduly discriminatory. The city claimed that its policy
was based on consideration of job requirements and sound medical and psychiatric
opinion finding homosexuals unsuitable for such positions. The court was unable to
decide the issue due to the conflicting medical and psychiatric testimony proffered. Al-
though denying the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff, the court ordered a full-
scale inquiry to find any statistical or other scientifically valid basis for exclusion.
48. See D. CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA 39 (1951), wherein the author as-
serts that summary dismissal is not an uncommon fate befalling the discovered homo-
sexual in private employment.
49. There have been challenges but the courts have not faced them. E.g., Scott v.
Macy, 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.
1968); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582
(D.C. Cir. 1963). Thus the general policy of excluding homosexuals from federal em-
ployment has been excluded from judicial review. See 82 HARV. L. REV. 1738, 1748
(1969). The most recent pre-Norton case, Scott v. Macy, developed when Scott, an
applicant who had successfully appealed a previous bar from federal employment on
grounds of immoral conduct, was again disqualified. In both appeals, Scott attempted
to force the court to review the Commission's policy of disqualifying homosexuals as
being unfit for service. The court ducked the issue in both cases, but overturned the
Commission's findings on procedural grounds. Dissenting in both opinions, Judge
Burger sternly criticized the majority, which included Chief Judge Bazelon, for failing
to face the issues. See Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Scott v.
Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
[Vol. XlX:267
Recent Developments
trict of Columbia Circuit firmly established as precedent a narrow interpre-
tation of the phrase, "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice." 50 Although these words might be used as the basis for almost any dis-
charge, 51 the Commission has failed to narrow the phrase in applying the
statute. On the contrary, through its suitability standards, the Commission
has sought to expand its statutory authority. 52 Now, with the advent of Nor-
ton, the Commission's removal authority has been strictly curtailed, and the
Commission will have to adjust its suitability requirements accordingly.
In the past, the Commission has enjoyed great latitude in its policy deter-
minations, and noting that homosexual conduct is contrary to the laws and
mores of our society, the Commission determined that homosexuals are not
suitable for federal employment. After Norton, the Commission may not
justify the exclusion of homosexuals on the ground that such conduct is con-
trary to the dominant conventional norms. Instead, there must be a show-
ing that the individual's conduct has an ascertainable deleterious effect on
the efficiency of the service. If Norton stands, the following seems clear:
(1) the Commission may not sustain the removal of a federal employee who
confines his homosexual conduct to off-duty hours, unless he occupies a
particularly sensitive position, and (2) the Commission may not exclude
every homosexual application from all federal positions.
50. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). See, e.g., Leonard v. Douglas,
321 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Eustace v. Day, 314 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
51. See Butler v. White, 83 F. 578, 585 (4th Cir. 1897), rev'd, 171 U.S. 379 (1898),
where the Fourth Circuit declared that a similar phrase, "for the good of the public
service," was "a reason that was employed by the officers of the government, when they
desired to remove any one that was obnoxious to them, long prior to the passage of the
civil service act. It is too general, vague, and indefinite to authorize . . . removal
52. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1968) provides that a person may be excluded from federal
employment for any of the following reasons: ". . . (b) Criminal, infamous, dis-
honest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct; (c) Intentional false statement or
deception or fraud in examination or appointment; (d) Refusal to furnish testimony as
required by § 5.3 of this chapter; (e) Habitual use of intoxicating beverages to excess;
(f) Reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of
the United States; or (g) Any legal or other disqualification which makes the individual
unfit for the service."
1969]
